Abstract-Single Sign-on (SSO) allows users to only log on once and then access different services via automatic authentication by using the same credential. However, most existing SSO schemes do not satisfy security notions or require a high trust level on a trusted third party (TTP), even though SSO has become popular in new distributed systems and computer networks. Motivated by this fact, we formalise a new security model of single sign-on, which not only satisfies strong security notions but also has a low trust level on TTP. We then propose a generic construction of SSO from nominative signatures, and present concrete initialisation. We also provide formal proofs to show that the proposed SSO scheme is secure according to our new formal model, if the underlying nominative signature is secure. We note that this is the first study that investigates the link between SSO and nominative signatures, which also be of an independent interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing number of current internet based services leads more burden for users, because they may have to maintain more and more username/password pairs. Meanwhile, this is also insecure and inefficient with the growth in the number of services. Single sign-on (SSO) is an authentication mechanism that allows users to only log on one time and then access different services via automatic authentication by using the same single credential. This means that SSO may be an effective way to make users relax at their daily work.
Kerberos is one of the earliest single sign-on solutions, proposed by Steiner et al. [16] in 1988, though it is called a network authentication system. The system consists of an Authentication Server, a Ticket Granting Server and a set of service providers. To acquire the Ticket Granting Ticket from a Ticket Granting Server, a user should first go through the authentication with Authentication Server. Actually, Authentication Server and Ticket Granting Server act together as a TTP (trusted third party), or called trusted identity provider [5] ), in an SSO scheme. However, not only the process of authentication but also the infrastructure management is very complex. Moreover, unproven symmetric mechanisms are used in Kerberos to authenticate users, which may lead to potential security weaknesses.
Released in 2005, OpenID [12] is one of the most successful single sign-on solutions, which is an open and decentralised approach for authenticating users. In OpenID, the user can freely select the identity providers from any web based application where he has registered with. Before signing on to a given web based application that supports OpenID, the user first signs on to the identity provider and OpenID exchanges the necessary authentication data between the identity provider and the application. However, the mechanism of exchanging data is complex and can be attacked through network based techniques [2] .
In 2010, Han et al. [5] proposed a novel dynamic SSO model together with a generic scheme. This scheme employs a digital signature scheme to guarantee both the unforgeability and the public verification of credential. In addition, a broadcast encryption is used to protect the privacy of credential, which means that except the authorised service providers nobody can check the validity of a credential. After the credential verification the user should run zeroknowledge proofs to prove that he/she is legal to use the valid credential, for resisting against impersonation attacks. However, the broadcast encryption is a complex and rather inefficient. In 2012, Yu et al. [20] proposed a single sign-on model with key exchange, and the advantage is that each user does not need hold a public/private key pair, while this is required in Han et al.'s model. However, the trust level of TTP is higher than that in Han et al.'s model, because in Yu et al.'s model the TTP is assumed to not impersonate any user, which is rather unrealistic.
Unfortunately, most of existing SSO systems have shortcomings. For example, in some SSO systems-like [3] , when the user wants to access a service by using a credential, the service provider (SP) has to directly communicate with the TTP because SP cannot verify the validity of credential. Another drawback is that some systems [9] , [13] , [14] are fragile to resist single point of failure, as the TTP is required to be always online. Moreover, SSO scheme proposed in [16] does not prevent illegal usage of a personal credential, since an illegal user can access services if he obtains a legal user's valid credential. Furthermore, SSO systems given in [5] , [20] require high trust level on the TTP. Based on these shortcomings, we are motivated to study single signon (SSO) in this paper by proposing a formal model and giving a construction from nominative signatures.
Classical digital signatures have been widely used to provide integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation for authenticating electronic messages. However, sometimes the users may not want their signatures being publicly verifiable. Nominative signature is such a primitive supporting no public verification. It consists of three parties: nominator, nominee and verifier. The nominator and nominee jointly generate a signature but only the nominee can verify it. Moreover, the validity of a nominative signature can only be determined by the help of the nominee, while any body else (including the nominator) will not be able to show the validity of the nominative signature to a verifier.
In 1996, Kim et al. [7] proposed the first notion and construction of nominative signature. However, it was found that the nominator can also verify the signature [6] . Then, Huang and Wang [6] proposed a new convertible nominative scheme, in which the nominee can convert a nominative signature into a publicly verifiable one when necessary. Unfortunately, in [18] , [4] , [17] , it was found that the nominator in Huang-Wang scheme can generate valid signatures alone and show the validity of the signature to anyone without the consent of the nominee. In 2007, Liu et al. [10] proposed a formal definition and a rigorous set of adversarial models for nominative signature, which is based on Chaums undeniable signature [1] and a strongly unforgeable signature scheme. In 2011, Schuldt and Hanaoka [15] proposed a stronger security model of nominative signature with a provably secure scheme. Our Contributions. In this paper, we aim to formalise the notion of single sign-on (SSO). This notion is motivated by the need of strong security requirements and low trust level of TTP in a single sign-on system. Then, we construct a generic SSO scheme from nominative signatures and prove that this SSO is secure under the proposed security model, by assuming that the underlying nominative signature is secure according to the model introduced by Schuldt and Hanaoka [15] . This means that we establish a relation between a cryptographic primitive and a security application: nominative signatures are a sufficient tool to construct SSO with low trust level of TTP. In addition, a concrete intialisation of the generic SSO is also presented. Paper Organization. In Section 2, we propose the formal definition and security notions for SSO. We review the formal definition and security notions of nominative signature in Section 3. Section 4 proposes a generic construction of SSO transformed from nominative signatures. In Section 5, a concrete initialisation is described. In Section 6, we provide formal security analysis of the proposed SSO scheme. In Section 7, we give some discussions and a short conclusion.
II. FORMAL MODEL OF SINGLE SIGN-ON
In this section, we provide a formal security model for single sign-on (SSO) model, which specifies both the syntax and security properties of SSO.
A. Syntax of Single Sign-on
In a SSO model, a user (U) obtains a single credential from a trusted third party (TTP) once and then authenticates himself to different service providers (SPs) by using the same credential. Now we formalise the syntax of SSO as follows by specifying its components: 
B. Security Definitions of Single Sign-On
Security requirements are crucial for a security system. In an SSO scheme, the TTP most concerns about whether others can generate the credential without its involvement. Users mainly worries about whether others who obtains his credential can access to SPs by impersonating him. The service providers most concern about whether their sevices can be accessed without holding a valid credential. Therefore, in the following we propose and formalize three security notions which should be considered. Namely, unforgeability, security against impersonation, and soundness. In order to formalise each security notion for SSO, we will define a series of games between two Turing machines: Challenger C and Adversary A.
1) Unforgeability: Intuitively, unforgeability means that any adversary A should not be able to forge a credential of a user U i if either the TTP's private key sk or the U i s private key sk i is unknown. Formally, we say that a SSO scheme is unforgeable, if no polynomially bounded adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger C in the following two games: A's advantage is defined to be the probability that A wins.
Definition 2. A Single Sign-on system is said to be unforgeable if no PPT (Probabilistic Polynomial Time) adversary has a non-negligible advantage in either Game 1 or Game 2.
2) Security against impersonation: Security against impersonation means that even though the adversary A has obtained the credential of a user U i , A should not be able to impersonate U i to access to SPs by executing SSO protocols.
Formally, we say that a SSO scheme is secure against impersonation, if no polynomially bounded adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger C in the following game: 
III. NOMINATIVE SIGNATURES

A. Syntax of Nominative Signatures
In this section, we describe one nominative signature scheme which was proposed in [15] . A nominative signature scheme involves a signer S and a nominee N, and is specified by the algorithms described below.
-Setup: The input is a security parameter 1 k , it outputs a set of public parameters par.
-KeyGen S , KeyGen N : The input is the public parameters par, it outputs a public-private signer and nominee key pair, (pk S , sk S ) and (pk N , sk N ), respectively. -Sign: The inputs are par, pk N , a message m, and sk S , it outputs a signature generation message δ. 
B. Security Notions for Nominative Signatures
For a nominative signature scheme to be secure [15] , the scheme should be unforgeable, invisible, and secure against malicious signers. Additionally, the confirm and disavow protocols are required to be zero-knowledge proofs.
1) Unforgeability: Unforgeability requires that it can not generate a valid signatures without the signer i.e. a malicious nominee should not be able to produce a signature on a message m, and then convince a verifier that the signature is valid, either by running the confirm protocol or by presenting a verification token, without having requested a signature on m from the signer.
Formally, we define unforgeability against a chosen message attack (uf-cma) of a nominative signature scheme N S via the experiment Exp
shown in Figure 1 . By x ← A O (y) it means that the algorithm A is executed on input y while being allowed to make queries to the oracle O, and that the output of A is assigned to x. For a pair of interactive algorithms, A and V, it writes z ← 2 { A (x 1 ) ↔ V (x 2 )} (y) to mean that A and V interact with common input y and private inputs x 1 and x 2 to A and V, respectively, and that the output of V, upon the completion of the interaction, is assigned to the variable z. Lastly, it will use the abbreviation PPT algorithm to mean a probabilistic 
Definition 5. A nominative signature scheme N S is said to be uf-cma secure if all PPT adversaries A have advantage Adv
2) Security against Malicious Signers: Our definition of security against malicious signers requires that any adversary with the knowledge of the private signer key should not be able to (1) produce a new valid nominative signature associated to the nominee, (2) convince a verifier about the validity or invalidity of a signature through the confirm or disavow protocols, regardless of the signature being valid or not, or (3) produce an accepting verification token for a signature he has not previously seen a verification token for.
Formally, Security against malicious signers of a nominative signature scheme N S is defined via the experiment Exp
shown in Figure 2 . In the experiment, A has 3) Invisibility: To ensure that no information leaked from the signer will reveal the validity of a signature, invisibility requires that an adversary with the knowledge of the private signer key, cannot distinguish between a valid signature, and a random element of the signature space.
Formally, we define invisibility under a chosen message attack (inv-cma) of a nominative signature scheme N S via the experiment Exp {(pk S , pk N , m, σ) : ∃sk N s.t.(pk N , sk N {(pk S , pk N , m, σ) : ∃sk N s.t.(pk N , sk N ) ∈ {KeyGen N (par)}∧V alid(par, pk S , m, σ, sk N ) = reject} The confirm protocols is required to be a zero-knowledge proof of membership for L, whereas the disavow protocol is required to be a zero-knowledge proof of membership for L.
IV. GENERIC CONSTRUCTION
This section describes how a nominative signature scheme can be directly transformed into an SSO scheme, where a nominative signature is employed as a user's credential. 1) Setup. Runs the Setup(k) to generate the public parameters par, which includes all public parameters in this scheme, and runs KeyGen S (par) to generate the public-private key pair (pk, sk) of TTP. 2) Enrollment.
• Service providers enrollment. SP j submits registration information RI j which includes the SP j s username and some other information to TTP. TTP issues an identity ID j to SP j , and stores (SP j , ID j ) for SP j . • User enrollment. U i generates his public-private key pair (pk i , sk i ) by running KeyGen N (par). U i sends his registration information RI i which includes the U i s username, public key pk i and some other information to the TTP. The TTP issues an identity
where AU i is a set that consists of the identities of the service providers that the user can access, and stores
• Login. U i uses his username and corresponding password to log in the system. grants the services to the user. Otherwise, SP j rejects the services. If the user wants to access to other SPs whose identities are listed in AU i , he can send credential to them directly, without having to request the TTP to issue a new credential for him, namely step (a) and (b) can be omitted.
V. INSTANTIATION
Now, we present a concrete SSO scheme by instantiating the above generic SSO with the concrete nominative signature scheme proposed by Schuldt and Hanaoka in [15] , while their scheme is inspired by [19] , [11] .
1) Setup(k): given 1 k , choose a bilinear map e: 
where m i is the i-th bit of m, and finally set TTP's public-private key pair (pk, sk) as pk ← (g S , h S , u 0 , ..., u n ) and sk ← α S .
2) Enrol(par, RI):
• Service providers enrollment: given par, SP j s registration information RI j which includes SP j s username and some other information. TTP issues an identity ID j to SP j , and stores (SP j , ID j ) for
where m i is the i-th bit of m. Lastly compute x 1 ← g Therefore, by combining Unforgeability I and Unforgeability II, we can conclude that the SSO scheme proposed above is unforgeable if the underlying nominative signature scheme is unforgeable and secure against malicious signers. The details of proofs for Theorems 1 and 2 are omitted due to space limit.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this section, we give a comparison between our scheme and Han et al.'s [5] scheme. In terms of security, both schemes can resist forging attack and impersonation attack. Moreover, both schemes can satisfy the requirement of soundness because of a zero-knowledge proof. However, the dependence for TTP of our scheme is lower, because TTP can not generate a credential only by himself. In terms of efficiency, Han's scheme uses a broadcast encryption, which reduces the efficiency of whole scheme. In our scheme, it is guaranteed that even though the attacker obtains the content of a credential, the attacker can not break the security of our scheme. Therefore, our new SSO scheme meets stronger security and is more efficient. In conclusion, based on the observation that the current SSO systems suffer from various security issues, we formalised a security model of single sign-on scheme and implemented a generic SSO by using any secure nominative signature scheme in this paper. In our model, SP is not required to communicate with TTP when it verifies the credential; an illegal person can not access to the SPs even though he/she obtains a user's valid credential; the soundness is satisfied and furthermore, the dependence of trusted third party is reduced.
